By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security
The group called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (known as ISIL or ISIS) is advancing towards Baghdad at an accelerated rate. After three days of fighting in and around Mosul, ISIL took the city virtually unchallenged as security officials fled.
One early estimate had security officials outnumbering ISIL terrorists 15:1 in Mosul alone.
An estimated 52,000 police and 12,000 soldiers in Mosul surrounded or fled.
According The Guardian sources, two divisions (of some 30,000 men) fled without a fight against some 800 ISIL terrorists. Other accounts say four divisions.
ISIL is estimated only to have a group of 6-7,000 terrorists nation-wide, according to Iraqi officials. The Iraqi military consists of fourteen divisions (four of them out of service). ISIL should not technically be a formidable threat.
Why the humiliating retreats and lack of morale from Iraqi armed forces and police?
Poor leadership can be found on all levels of the Iraqi security complex. The police chief of Mosul and the commanders were reported the first to leave Mosul! Most pressing of all is that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki previously used the military and police forces to impose his government’s rule rather than political reconciliation. This has been a pressing issue since the fall of Saddam and the restoration of government there. Implementing Sunni tribal leadership schemas came too little too late (most were taken over by more radical players like the ISIL).
The Iraqi military and police do not on the whole believe in a national mission. They continue to have dual loyalties and most are simply there for the money and benefits the job incurs rather than face unemployment. They are rapidly losing faith in their government or political Iraq as it exists yesterday under the constitution and today in dispute. Desertion has been growing the last half of this year. The Iraqi Armed Forces could not retake the first major cities to fall either (e.g. Fallujah and Ramadi).
ISIL torture, assassination and bombings are well known for their brutality and propagated as part of their terror campaign. A one hour video was just released where a Sunni Iraqi police major is attacked in his home; blindfolded, handcuffed and the head is slowly hacked off to promote fear of new recruits into the Iraqi security forces and low morale in the ranks. They also target leadership, capture them and force them to dig their own graves in the desert before their throats are slit.
Iraqi security personnel and civilians do not have to see these videos to be affected. Iraqis need only to believe the accounts and experience the gunfire closing in. Rumors that ISIL is approaching their direction give them their choice to hold ground or retreat based on their big picture and beliefs.
Lastly, a larger Shia military exists because the Sunni were originally not allowed to participate and later refused to do so. The last best place for a Shia right now, especially the security forces, is in Sunni territory where they have few friends. Retreat to Shia strongholds is a natural reaction of security from disorganized and unprofessional soldiers and officers; especially at those numbers.
For the moment, ISIL marches toward a victory of expulsion of Shia through a ruthless and successful fear campaign. On the other hand, the group presents a narrative of hope and liberation to Sunni populations that despise Shia authorities.
Defeating ISIL
It is far too tempting to call for the destruction of ISIL and at this point, not possible without great cost and commitment. ISIL has proven itself to be both ruthless and clever. They can only be defeated if they can be outsmarted; not by force alone.
ISIL gains are rooted in three key things: 1) the need for Sunni representation; 2) outside help and instigation from foreign states and transitional actors; 3) clever thinking with a previous divide and conquer strategy and now seize and replace strategy.
ISIL weaknesses: contested legitimacy between rival Iraqi authorities and Sunni leaders; too ideologically extreme for most Sunni and Iraqi way of life; indiscriminate violence, and seen as unpredictable by the people. Most likely, they will continue to be too slow to transition from an extreme terrorist organization or movement into benign and even capable rulers of the larger Iraqi Sunni majority.
Imposing extreme versions of Sharia on the Iraqi people will only incite them further to hate ISIL perhaps even more than they did the Maliki regime. Where fear is the biggest strength of ISIL, it is also their greatest weakness in the long-run, as they are terrorists by nature who will oppress and brutalize the Sunni Iraqis beneath them.
There is a full range of tactical weakness in ISIL that can naturally be exploited. The U.S. and Iraq could destroy terrorists with drones, strike bases and eliminating munition stocks; all of that might prove to be considerably valuable about now. But the overall success of ISIL is that they were strategically aligned with larger Sunni uprising and the Shia apathy to serve in the military. The opponents of ISIL must get into their heads and into the hearts of the Iraqi people.
Militia to militia warfare between Sunni and Shia is expected. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a top Shia cleric revered by Iraqis, called for Shia to fight and promised martyrdom glory with all of the bells. However, Sistani has backed the voluntary military sign-ups, called on by Maliki. This means that the ranks of the Iraqi military are swelling with religious fervor on the side of the Shia. Effectively, the opposite of what President Obama has asked for before America becomes involved is happening. A call to Shia jihad has been woven into the government apparatus.
Without external forces ISIL begins to tear the country apart and leaves sectarian chaos behind. The southern surrounding Arab states and Iran to the east will attempt to prevent this menace from approaching their borders; regardless, of any U.S. action or not. They will also contend for Iraq, with Iran having the most to lose at the moment.
The visible state or non-state victor of Iraq will hold the geopolitical crown jewel that establishes them as the dominant de facto regional player, but only if such a one can be found among the rubble of tomorrow’s Baghdad.
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