By William Tucker
One of the maxims of counterterrorism professionals is the belief that terrorism does not occur in a vacuum. Students of political violence may recognize the statement, but the description of this statement often varies depending on who is queried. I take a very general point of view and often define the maxim as simply meaning support. Terrorists need some form of support if they are to be successful and this doesn’t always mean state sponsorship, although for the purpose of this post that is the topic we will be following.
Terrorism doesn’t occur spontaneously. Those individuals or groups that decide to engage in political violence must learn the craft or they will fail quickly. It is also important to remember that just because an attack is successful doesn’t mean that a single tactical advantage will transform into a strategic victory. Take for instance the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski. In the simplest terms Kaczynski was anti-technology and preferred to act alone. Because of this it took time for him to create a mail bomb that was effective and even longer for a bomb to actually kill someone. In the end Kaczynski was a failure because his ideas did not motivate a larger trend nor was he able to cause enough havoc to capitalize on. Lone wolves can be dangerous, but they hardly have the ability or effectiveness to garner the attention of foreign intelligence services for recruitment.
Terrorist groups or movements on the other hand are far more useful in a strategic setting. Larger movements have the ability to recruit specialized talent and often to have a better reach spreading their political doctrine thus cultivating a support apparatus. Terrorism and support for terrorism breed off one another increasing the movement’s effectiveness. In some cases a terrorist group will become proficient enough that intelligence services and law enforcement take notice. Unfortunately, some intelligence services will actively provide training and funding to a terrorist group if it is seen as beneficial to a nations foreign policy.
Intelligence services of a nation state can be rather effective when given proper resources and relevant leeway to accomplish a goal. A recent example is the chaos that was recently witnessed in Kyrgyzstan. Within 24 hours the government was toppled and an interim government was stood up followed by financial support from Russia. According to sources on the ground, Russian intelligence officers seized control of the local media outlets in Kyrgyzstan just prior to the beginning of the protests. In this case, Russia wants better control of the Kyrgyz government as it asserts itself in the former Soviet states. However, some intelligence operations require a little more anonymity and some states fill this requirement with support for terrorism.
Iran, often depicted as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, is a great example of a nation state that heavily relies on terrorism to further its national interest. Iranian intelligence does not function in the same manner as most tradition intelligence services. Rather than operating as a true bureaucracy, Iranian intelligence services such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps – Qods Force have little oversight and often compete in sponsoring of international non-state actors. Both agencies are also free from the legislative hindrances that affect intelligence agencies of other nations. In essence, both agencies are wholly focused on operations and outsource analysis to other agencies or universities thus leaving them to pursue the strategic agenda of the Iranian government unencumbered.
Understand that these are just examples of how terrorism can be used on a strategic level and are not meant to be all inclusive. Any nations grand strategy will often require creative means to pursue the national goals and often times this can include non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. This is a complex topic that can fill volumes; however when it come to terrorist operations occurring outside of a vacuum we must understand that finding the support element can often be the most important aspect of counterterrorism.
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