from the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response
On Monday, 17 April 2006, a suicide bomber detonated a large explosive at a Tel Aviv fast food stand in the vicinity of the Old Central Bus Station killing 9 and wounding approximately 50civilians. The Islamic Jihad terror group and the Al Aksa Brigades, affiliated with Fatah, have claimed responsibility for the attack. The bomber attempted to gain entry into the restaurant; however, was challenged and was prevented entry by a security guard posted at the entrance.
Prior to Monday afternoon’s attack in Tel Aviv, Israel’s intelligence agencies were reporting 19 specific intelligence reports of planned terrorist attacks, and another eighty more general threats.
According to latest reports, the driver of a suspicious vehicle, allegedly involved in transporting the bomber to his destination, has been apprehended by security forces at a checkpoint on Jerusalem-Tel Aviv Highway, near Ramallah.
- From this incident the interdiction by a private security guard that was posted at the entrance to the restaurant. The detonation of the bomber in an open environment mitigated a more catastrophic attack if the bomber would have been successful in gaining entrance to the restaurant.
- Another point to mention specific to this incident, is the quick response by law enforcement in establishing predetermined and spontaneous checkpoints. This is planned and trained in an attempt at apprehending any fleeing accomplices from the scene.
In the wake of the suicide bombing attack this afternoon in Tel Aviv, Israel, the Center for Actionable Intelligence of ITRR has decided to release from the archives a previous “lessons learned” report issued after an earlier bombing at the same Tel Aviv location.
An Overview and Lessons Learned Suicide Bombing
Old Central Bus Station
Tel Aviv, Israel
Thursday, 19 January 2006
Infrastructure background:
On the date Thursday January 19, 2006 at 1540 hours a suicide bomber walked into the Mayor Shwarma Restaurant situated in the busy and congested Old Central Bus Center in the Southern part of the City of Tel Aviv. This most recent bombing, offers learning points with regards to the operational tempo and adversarial tactics of the terrorist organization.
On this date 32 civilians were injured with the casualties coming from both outside and inside of the restaurant where the bomber detonated himself. Of the 32 casualties, approximately half were in the restaurant, leaving the remaining casualties to have been bystanders passing the restaurant.
The political background to this most recent bombing comes at a time when the Palestinian Authority as well as the Hamas is taking part in local elections on January 22, 2006. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the deadliest of organizations over the last few months in Israel, has decided to boycott any elections. Israeli intelligence agencies have identified this declaration by the Islamic Jihad, as a call to arms and a call to escalate violence within Israel.
Based on security forces terror log for the date, there were 53 general alerts 10 specific alerts and no specific intelligence on the target location.
Another point for consideration is the Terror Triangle identified by the Israel Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz. The terror triangle is the means for planning and executing terror attacks within the State of Israel by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It has been identified to the fact that the Iranian Government has been funding the attacks, while the Syrian headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in conjunction with Syrian Government agencies, has taken the role of planning the specific Iranian funded attack. Execution of the plan is done by the PIJ.
The site:
The older of two main bus stations in the city of Tel Aviv, this bus station was for years the main thoroughfare for internal public transportation throughout the country, until the newer transportation center was built two blocks away. This central bus station is built in an open environment spanning on approximately 6 square blocks with almost unlimited access points for pedestrians and vehicles. In that this bus station spans approximately a 6 block radius, access by foot and vehicles is easy and can pose a major threat when the adversary targets this location.
The new transportation center, a closed structure, is built with minimal access points, all of which controlled by highly trained and armed private security and under the supervision of the Tel Aviv police precinct. A similar transportation venue was built in Jerusalem in recent years as well, whereby; security forces are able to control in an “enclosed” environment access to the site both by foot and vehicle.
The old central bus station sits among outdoor vendors, home appliance stores, butchers, and a sundry of food stands. The population that tends to migrate to the old central bus station is the local businesses, the homeless population and many foreign workers. It is a preferred location of the local businesses and nearby employees to go for a fast meal, as well as a place to relax at the end of the week, prior to the Jewish Sabbath. In that it is an area quite congested with the traffic both of the new transportation center, the old central bus station, and the local population running errands or eating on location, there is a unique presence of “door to door” vendors that are selling to the passersby anything that they can carry on their back or hang on their shoulder. This may include small tools, religious gifts, perfumes, or even dollar exchange.
Past attacks:
For a number of reasons, of which this article will address, the old central bus station has been a “preferred” site for past suicide attacks. On January 2002, 32 Israelis were injured, three of which seriously, when a SB detonated himself on the main pedestrian walkway of the old central bus station, Neve Sha’anan. This was followed by a deadlier attack on July 2002. On this date, two suicide bombers detonated themselves at the popular local Coffee House, “Mercaz HaGarinim”, situated in the center of the old central bus station. A total of five fatalities and dozens were injured, of which many foreign workers. The attacks progressively became more and more sophisticated, and during the month of January 2003 two simultaneous attacks targeted this site. On this date, one suicide bomber ambushes a large group of pedestrians that are waiting at one of the larger bus stops within the station. With emergency personnel en route and approximately a minute following the first attack, the second bomber detonates himself on the main pedestrian walkway, Neveh Sha’anan. In this attack, a total of 23 killed, and hundreds were injured.
Incident Eyewitness accounts:
- “When I approached the restaurant, a man approached me carrying a large bag, and offered to sell me razor blades. A lot of people like this walk around here”
- “He had a deep accent, I looked him in the eyes and nothing aroused my suspicion. After I paid for my sandwich, I realized he had walked into the restaurant as well. Then a loud explosion and the smell of death”
- “I stood right next to the restaurant and I saw the terrorist. He had a beard, wore a black jacket, like the type the guards wear, and a hat. He stood at the entrance, looked right and left and hesitated for a few seconds, and when he went into the restaurant a terrible explosion occurred.”
The attack
As per the Tel Aviv Police Department, the bomber, Sami Abed El-Hafir Anter, 19, a member of the PIJ and a resident of the Palestinian city of Nablus had arrived that day to execute the attack. Anter was a physical education student studying for his bachelor’s degree at Anjach University in his hometown. He carried with him a relatively small device that was in his backpack that he carried on his shoulder. Even though there were a large amount of casualties (32 total), the device was only partially detonated which caused great danger in the rescue efforts by Israel Emergency Medical Services (MDA).
The suicide bomber and the cell that dispatched him to the location had strategically chosen the site, the date, and time for this attack. The time and day of the week that the attack was perpetrated was Thursday at 1540 hours. For natives that live and work in the vicinity of the Old Central bus station, this is an ideal time to maximize the casualties by guaranteeing a large amount of people in the vicinity. The end of the week is the period when soldiers are returning home from their bases, employees are leaving work for the start of the weekend (Friday and Saturday), and local residents are shopping for the upcoming Sabbath.
This soft target is right next to a secure and hardened transportation venue. It in essence has zero access control. This is compounded by the fact that the population that shops and crosses this arena, includes both foreign workers, Israelis, and Palestinians returning home to the Palestinian Authority. These factors only contribute to the ability of a terror cell to operate in such an environment in order to do preoperational surveillance, target selection, and even recruitment of Palestinian employees that work in the vicinity.
The adversary had prior knowledge of site and had done some level of preoperational surveillance of this target either specifically for this attack or earlier attacks at the same location. In addition, the bomber had dressed and acted appropriately for the scene. This included dressing like an outdoor vendor; selling items to the pedestrians crossing his path (see eyewitness accounts). Based off of eye witness accounts, at least the bomber himself had been in the vicinity of his target for some period of time prior to the attack. The reasoning behind this may be numerous; however, one can imagine that the cell was awaiting the right amount of people inside the target before the bomber hit his target. The cover that the bomber was given was extremely effective in not arousing suspicion, enabling him to maximize his presence in the vicinity. No knowledge of handler presence or other parts of the PIJ cell.
Lessons Learned
From this attack, security personnel and law enforcement can understand the operational factors of the adversary. Some points for consideration in your planning, training, and exercising procedures:
- The adversary has repeatedly targeted transportation venues. There is great difficulty in hardening every transportation venue.
- With that, at most transportation points, there is a high concentration of civilians that can be targeted by the adversary.
- Access to many transportation nodes is easy with minimal access control and security. This also enables ease by the adversary to perform preoperational surveillance.
- Law enforcement can utilize a mixture of covert and overt (including over watch positions) presence at locations where access control is difficult to execute along with K9s and surprise checkpoints. All these tactics may increase the difficulty in the adversary operating in such an environment.
- Intelligence gathering on a constant basis would help allocate resources based on imminent threats.
- The adversary chooses targets based on success. The cell prefers to be successful in hitting the target and will pass over targets that have been hardened and the possibility of success is decreased.
- Along with preoperational surveillance to identify appropriate targets, the adversary makes great effort into dressing the bomber appropriately for the mission.
- The bomber apparently had been sometime in the vicinity that day prior to the attack. In utilizing covert and overt law enforcement, successful identification of the bomber or his handler may have facilitated in thwarting the attack or a postponement of the attack by the celll.
- The device only detonated partially, causing an extremely unstable environment for rescue personnel. Proper procedures need to be implemented to coordinate rescue operations in conjunction with the bomb squad.
Summary:
In order to respond appropriately to such an incident, law enforcement and emergency services needs to train and conduct field exercises in conjunction with the relevant agencies, as well as covert and overt officers. Such training sessions can assist in preparing for such a response and ease the coordination and collaboration of the responding agencies. The attack can be thwarted at various levels during the planning process. It is preferred, for obvious reasons, to interdict at the adversarial preoperational surveillance phase as opposed to the dispatch of the bomber. Emergency managers must train for all levels of the response and need to respond as if there is a secondary device targeting the first responders. Different response scenarios should be addressed both at the policy and procedure stages as well as “going out” and testing the plan.
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