By William Tucker
Over the past few weeks there have been small reports making their way through the press that suggest North Korea conducted two covert nuclear tests in 2010. Further adding to the intrigue is new reporting that suggests one of the tests was a weapon of Iranian design. There are plenty of reasons to be skeptical of these claims, but perhaps the most compelling is the lack of any seismic data consistent with a nuclear detonation. The only data available to suggest that a nuclear event occurred is derived from several radioisotope monitoring stations in the region run by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. Several isotopes that are typically found following a man-made nuclear event – whether from a weapons test or a reactor accident – were present in the April/May 2010 timeframe. Data aside, there are several events that occurred in 2010 that deserve scrutiny.
Background on the Nuclear Data
Because of the lack of seismic data the information acquired via the monitoring stations wasn’t given priority for analysis. It wasn’t until August 2010 that a group of nuclear experts meeting in Vienna discussed the anomaly. One of the scientists present, Lars-Erik De Geer of the Swedish Defense Research Agency, decided the readings were significant enough to pursue. After a year of research, it was De Geer’s conclusion that North Korea conducted two separate covert nuclear tests using enriched uranium as opposed to the plutonium devices used in 2006 and 2009. De Geer puts the yield of the alleged 2010 tests between 50 to 200 tons of TNT. The results are scheduled to be published next month and it is this paper that has drawn much of the present publicity. Many scientists reviewing De Geer’s work have found the conclusion in the paper to be dubious, but the assertions may force dissenting scientists – and the CNTBTO – to revisit the data. If this was a small scale nuclear test, or an accident originating from a North Korean nuclear facility, the collected data certainly deserves further analysis. If nothing else, De Geer has done a public service by raising the issue of these detected isotopes.
A Supporting Perspective
Riding the coattails of De Geer’s report is Hans Ruhle, former head of the planning department of the German Defense Ministry. Ruhle supports De Geer’s claim that a nuclear test was indeed conducted in 2010, but adds that the suspected uranium device used in the test indicates origins outside of North Korea. In this case the suspect country is Iran. The article that contains Ruhle’s assertions was published in the German Daily Die Welt and has ignited a fierce debate. Ruhle claims that his position is backed by “several intelligence agencies,” however he does not name the agencies, their governing nations, nor the source of this claim. This is not to say that Ruhle is spreading falsehoods; rather there is just no way to validate his claims. Until more concrete, verifiable evidence is made public from these “several intelligence agencies” Ruhle’s claims will have to be shelved for now. Furthermore, there are verifiable reports from numerous intelligence agencies that state North Korea was pursuing uranium enriched nuclear devices independently. Although there is precedent for testing nuclear devices in other nations (North Korea tested two nuclear devices in Pakistan in 1998 according to declassified U.S. intelligence estimates), suggesting that the alleged testing took place with Iranian designed nuclear devices is a bit of a stretch without supporting information. Again, this is not meant to disparage Herr Kuhle, instead it just highlights the need for more data to support these claims.
What We do Know
When it comes to this claim of nuclear testing in 2010 the only verifiable information to support the claim is the isotopes detected by the CNTBTO monitoring stations in the region. That being said, there is plenty of verifiable information on cooperation between Iran and North Korea. Iran is known to have had a delegation in North Korea for the 2009 nuclear test and Tehran sent another delegation in April 2010. Although the timing of the second delegation is intriguing, given the timeline for the alleged 2010 nuclear tests, the composition and purpose of the delegation is unknown. For its part, Iran has been working on several missiles of North Korean design that are suspected by the IAEA of being prepped for mating with a nuclear warhead. It wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to assume that they are cooperating on nuclear capable delivery systems. But again, this past cooperation doesn’t necessary prove that North Korea conducted two nuclear tests on Iran’s behalf.
Other areas of cooperation occurred in Syria at both the al-Kibar nuclear facility and a chemical weapons facility in Aleppo.* North Korea is also known to supply weapons to Iran for transport to Hezbollah in Lebanon. These cooperative endeavors are well documented and it is possible that the two nations will engage one another in the more challenging aspects of nuclear weapons development. The problem that we face is one of circumstantial evidence. We have the detection of isotope anomalies and the documented cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran. Taken together this doesn’t necessarily support the claim of a nuclear test in 2010, but it doesn’t discount it either. Information that has been presented is compelling enough for further research because it is clear that something did indeed happen in the April/May 2010 timeframe. At this point what that something is, quite simply, is unknown.
*The al-Kibar nuclear facility was destroyed by the Israelis in 2007. In that same year several North Korean and Iranian scientists were killed while trying to attach a mustard gas warhead to a Scud C missile just outside of Aleppo, Syria. What caused that accident is still unknown.
Comments are closed.