AMU Homeland Security Opinion

Russian Mixed Signals, All Part of the Plan

By Brett Daniel Shehadey
Special Contributor for In Homeland Security

‘We stand for this. We stand for that.’ ‘We are for you. We are against you.’

Russia is known for sending out mixed political signals to thwart its opponents and gauge public response. These mixed signals, often a duality, polarize the public into two distinct political camps where one favors their interests and the other is marginalized from their core set of objectives and easily deal with through various means and efforts over time.

In many ways, the mixed signals let out by Russian rulers are like the political variant of Ancient Greek daemons (or spirits) in that they soon take on a life of their own but one that can be influenced on many levels during their growth cycle. Political ideologies and perception building is the key framework needed to sow them but it is nurtured with instigation, provocation and confusion; added to this is a splice of cognitive dissonance projected into Russian society. Mixed signal strategies are clear to be used by their practitioners only in the understanding that there is a clear majority in favor of the real intent and the minority opposed can be vilified, subdued and or challenged successfully.

This political strategy is a patented Russian favorite and seen most substantially as a stratagem in the de facto and deliberate dual rule and rivalry of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin. In this case, the Putinist oligarchs set up two frameworks for Russia using a straw-man political position that was intended to self-defeat as Putin undermined it and ruled Russia as the Prime Minister. Then President Medvedev pushed for international cooperation and harmony in accordance to Western ideals while Putin pushed for Russian nationalist principles of expansionism and unionism; a larger geopolitical sphere of influence and venting a subtle but growing hostility to the Western instilled global architecture and domestic interference. Thus they presented two political faces- one for the West and their support from Russian nationals and the other against it. The path to self-determination was the real goal Putin and the inner circle had designed and became the real victor.

The approach to present two seemingly contradictory political position roots out and vilifies challengers and supporters. Then the power elites gain more followers and isolate or create a clearly visible opponent for their political backers and sympathizers to propel their cause. Meanwhile, the Putinist siloviki in the larger political landscape can appear to distance themselves from policy issues or the larger conflict in question, only to manipulate it again through calculated bold moves and its security services. They refrain from commitments by playing both sides of a more apparent political duality only for as long as is profitable to their political objectives.

We see this favored Putin practice in Ukraine at this very hour. On the one hand, Putin plays the cards of a hardcore Russian ethno-nationalist and gains strong support and applause in Russia and with Russians abroad. On the other hand, Russia produces a virtual semblance of cooperation with the West through selective diplomatic engagements. In the end, he creates a clear enemy of Russia (Kiev “Nazis” and evil Western conspirators). He also adds to his political base and maintains a position of non-commitment while being close and committed at the same time sub rosa.

His statements and actions are consistent with this strategy of engaging the enemy and friends in varied presentation that is suitable to his timing and purposes. In addition, to this form of statecraft, the methods follow: acting covertly with bandits and thieves, using covert special forces, intelligence operatives, denying accusations of foul play personally, admitting to aggressions, signing agreements for cooperation through the Foreign Ministry, etc.

Putin will step in when certain thresholds have been established to favor his political objectives which soon become the national interest of the Russian Federation. He will expect a planned, assured, victory before the next course of action. Russia is playing to win while the West is playing that Putin backs down with further threats of sanctions.

Even now, as the Russian and pro-Russian Ukrainians in the eastern parts of Ukraine take a referendum that goes against Putin’s official position that they should not hold the referendum. By ignoring ‘official Putin’ they are now acting on his behalf anyway. Even if many in the West become fooled or misdirected into thinking that the separatists are more independent from Moscow than they really are, his involvement remains fixed to his engineered political framework already set in motion. Once a political ideal is shared, the groups maintain the extension of his hand and the intended original course.

Putin can effectively snub both his Western opposition and also his pro-Russian separatist allies that he attempts to manipulate. He can say, ‘Look guys, I have tried hard to work with you on the matter. You were rude and uncooperative. I did my part, but you failed to do yours.’

Thus, Moscow attempts to dislodge itself from the separatists and as long as it condemns any and all actions from Kiev—most especially the provoked violent actions—those that are contrary to common interest with the east, it will remain in union with them and the sphere of influence will not evaporate.

Russia is, however, still free to turn on would-be friends if need be, just as it is free to keep the ball rolling in the intended direction. Much depends on the value of the political ball and the national resources needed to keep it going and the response of any Russian antagonists.

Putin will continue to play with Washington’s firm diplomatic position that the votes in the referendum in eastern regions of Ukraine are illegal and designed to cause trouble. He thus further isolates the West from and de-legitimizes its position on the democratic process, using his artificially constructed Potemkin democracy attempts and the strategy of mixed signals. Putin will take everything from the West that he can in terms of spinning a negative image against it and a positive one for himself (i.e. Russia). The strategic diplomacy war is one of perception, image, information and intelligence between Russia and the world. This is the real game Putin wants to play—the only political game he knows.

 

 

 

 

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